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I. INTRODUCTION 
The trial court ruling in this case, if left undisturbed, threa ens to undermine the 
language and intent of California Business and Professions Code §14205(e)(3), which 
considers five years of continuous use in commerce evidence as a matter of law of 
secondary meaning in a professional, personal name, and deprive Plaintiff-Appellant 
[he eafter "Appellant") Carla Ison, PhD., of the well-established legal right to amend 
her complaint liberally to add related causes of action as the facts warrant. The ruling 
would also, absurdly, allow Defendant-Respondents [hereafter "Respondents"] Google. 
Inc. and Yahoo! Inc, to sabotage the efforts of professionals throughout the state to 
establish trade names for their businesses since many professionals utilize their 
personal names in a professional context and rules of professional conduct frequently 
make it difficult to practice under so-ealled 'fanciful" trade names. The court ignored 
well-established and commonly understood principles of the "'relation back" doctrine, 
even though the additional causes of action arise easily out of the previous allegations. 
Finally, the court asserted incorrectly that all causes of action in the Fourth Amended 
Complaint ('4AC") necessarily must be dismissed should the Appellant fail to establish 
secondary meaning in her professional name. (CT V o . 17, pp. 4093-4172, 4AC; vol. 30, 
p. 7607, Order.) 
This appeal arises out of a longstanding dispute between Appellant and 
Respondents over her attempts to market her psychology practice over the Internet. (CT 
vol. 17 pp. 4093-4172, 4AC; vol, 304. 7607, Order) Appellant went to great lengths 
to try to work through the Respondents'cuStomer serv`ce departments, ultimately to no 
avail (CT vol.17, 4103, line 11-4105, line 25, 4AC). 
Three main issues undergird this appeal: 
1) Did the lower Court wrongfully deny Appellant Carla Ison, Ph.D. (hereafter 
"Appellant"), her day in court by denying of her Motion for Leave to further 
amend her Complaint? 
2) Did the lower•Court wrongfully deny Appellant her day in court by granting 
summary judgment to both Respondents? 
3) Finally, did the lower Court inappropriately restrict discovery by Appellant? 
The answer to each question is yes, although there does not appear to be any California 
case directly on point under Bus.Prof.Code 14205(0(3). 
Respondents are both giants in the Internet browsing market, each operating 
programs in which businesses pay to advertise services and/or goods on the Internet. 
Googles online advertising program is known•as "Adwords." Yahoo! operates a 
similar program which is currently called "Yahoo! Se eh Marketing" (they have 
offered the same or similar, programs under different names in the past). In these 
programs, advertise s pay the Respondents each time one of the advertisers ads is 
"clicked," Le. electronically selected, by a person or a software program. 
In addition, Respondents operate programs in which website owners can earn 
money by allowing the Respondent to place advertisements p oduced by the 
Respondent's advertising customers on the website owners' websites. Google's ad 
hosting program, open to all website owners, is called AdSense; Yahoo's program, 
2 
offered in partnership with Microsoft; Inc., under-the name Bing Yahoo! Search 
Network or Bing Ads, is restricted to a selected number of websites under contract with 
Yahoo! and/or Microsoft. Yahoo's earlier ad hosting program, which was offered 
between 2005 and April, 2010--the relevant period in this case in regard to Yahoo's 
misuse of Appellant's identity--was called "Yahoo! Publisher Network." Like Google's 
AdSense program, Yahoo! Publisher Network was open to all website owners on the 
Internet. 
Appellant contracted with Respondent Google to procure Internet advertising 
services via AdWords and with Respondent Yahoo! to host her website, 
www.carlaisonphd.com. 
Both Respondents recruit new advertising and website hosti g customers with 
promises of enhanced visibility on the Internet and, as a result of this v sibility, 
increased business; however, neither Respondent warns their clients, before or after the 
clients enroll in the Respondents' advertising and/or website hosting programs, that by 
enroll ng in these programs, the clients' professional business names and identities may 
be sold for use as a "keywords" to direct Internet traffic to Internet-based advertising 
and other online content that is unrelated to the elients' businesses, that the Respondents 
might actually suggest their professional names be used as keywords by third parties, 
and that third-party websites to which the clients' business names and identities are 
being used to drive traffic may not contain any infbrmation about the clients. 
Respondents also do not warn their advertising and website hosting clients that, by 
enrolling in the Respondents' pmgran the clients business names and identities may 
become linked with undesirable content, such as pornography, on the Internet for an 
indefinite amount of time—in some cases for years. Respondents further fail to warn 
• their clients that the dissemination of the clients' business names and identities through 
the Respondents' technology, which both enables consumers' searches of the Internet 
and inserts clients' business names in the results of such searches, will itself create a 
feedback loop in which the clients' business names and identities become more 
desirable for purchase by third parties as keywords in Responden s' advertising 
programs. 
The most sought after feature of both Respondents' advertising programs is the 
ability to purchase keywords in order to &lye Internet traffic to websites. While not 
objectionable in the abstract, when the keywords consist of the identity of a person or 
their business, whether there a e trademark violations or not, the use of that identity to 
promote third-party products and services not only suggests to consumers endorsement 
or sponso ship of those third-party products or services by the person or business whose 
identity is being used, but does so without permission from or compensation to, the 
owner of that identity. No one would question the illegality of a television commercial 
that asserted that Dr. X advises you buy product Y, without Dr. X s knowledge, 
permission and compensation. Yet this is essentially what has been occurring when 
third parties purchase Appellant's professional name as a keyword from Respondents in 
order to direct traffic to those third parties products and services. AdWords potentially 
even lures unsuspecting third parties into unla fully activity by suggesting as keywords 
• others' names and identitie . 
Not only do Respondents fail to warn advertising clients of the downside of 
participating in Respondents' advertising ca paigns and website hosting programs, but 
Respondents intentionally present confusing, often unintelligible explanations of their 
programs in thousands of pages of online documentation, making it impossible for even 
a reasonably intell gent business owner to fully navigate and understand in order to 
make an assessment of r sks and benefits of these programs, Indeed, with exception to 
customer lists covered by a protective orde , the entirety of written discovery provided 
by the Respondents consisted of thousands of pages of customer service information 
already available to the Appellant as an AdWords customer. Moreover, the Respondents 
have the means at their disposal to fully protect advertising and website hosting clients, 
such as Appellant, from the abuse of their identities---in fact, they are the only parties 
who have the means to fully protect their cl ents in the context of their programs—but 
they refuse to do so; nor do they inform prospective clients of that fact. The interests of 
justice require that this misconduct by Respondents be addressed. (CT vol. 17, p. 4105, 
lines 12-25, 4AC; vol. 29, pg,7254, Imes 2-14, RSUF vol. 29, pg.7327, lines 14-16, 
Mandel Decl.) 
Appellant sought to obtain the assistance of legal counsel for more than two years 
atter she began discovering the Respondents' violations in order 16 assist in defending 
her professional reputation, and wresting online control of it from Respondents. 
Interviews of over 25 attorneys in the Bay Area revealed that most were not w iling to• 
oppose Respondents, fearing repercussions, it was not until the fall of 2009 that 
Appellant found an attorney, Mr. Burke Hansen, in San Francisco who was willing to 
assist her with the case. By the time Appellant located an intellectual property spec alist 
willing to assist with the case, she had already amended her Complaint four times to 
clarify her claims against Respondents. Although the 4AC contained claims (and 
unpleaded potential claims) that were not rightfully limited by whether or not she 
possessed trademark rights in her professional name, the lower Court granted 
Respondents' motions tbr summary judgment in their entirety and denied her leave to 
amend, thereby dismissing the Appellant's entire case. CT vol. 29, pg.7252, lines 20-28, 
p. 7253, lines 1-8 Pl's Resp. to Google's Sep Stat. vol, 30, pp. 7607-7608, Order Re: 
Google's Mot for SJ.) Unfair competition, which has been claimed since the initial 
complaint, for example, covers any unlawful or unethical behavior in commerce. 
While Appellant's recently hired intellectual property legal counsel was in the 
process of reviewing the history of the proceedings and the facts, as well as pouring 
through documents and responses to discovery that Respondents finally began 
producing in ea ly summer of 2012, she was bombarded by demands by both 
Respondents on a daily bas s. When, in the midst of all of these demands, Appellant's 
new counsel realized that testimony was needed from 
	 senior corporate representatives of 
both Respondents in order to understand facts relating to Appellant's claims, both 
Respondents engaged in unrelenting stonewalling, preventing Appellant from 
mean ngful discovery of corporate representatives, and, in self-serving fashion, 
interpreting discovery rulings as limiting Appellant to a narrow field of inquiry for any 
and all discovery requests (CT vol. 29, p.7327, lines 14-24, pg.7328, lines 3-25, Mandel 
Deel.). After Appellant obtained the Respondents' parsimonious d scovery responses 
(parsimonious in their responsiveness, though certainly not in volume), and after 
consulting with her recently hired intellectual property specialist, Appellant realized 
• that, regardless of whether Respondents had infringed her trademark rights, she also had 
related claims arising out of the originally pleaded facts as well as the newly obtained 
evidence. However, with the Respondents' motions for summary judgment misleadingly 
asserting to the lower Court that all of the claims of the 4AC arose solely out of the 
Appellant's disputed marks, Appellant sought to amend the claims to clarify which 
rested solely on her trademark claims and which did not, (CT vol. 15, pp. 3618-3867 
and vol. 16, pp. 3868-3928, Yahoo's Mot fbr SJ, vol.16, pp.3929 -4066 and vol. 17, pp. 
4067-4323, Google's Mot for SJ.) Appellant diligently sought to amend the 4AC; her 
new limited scope counsel informed both Respondents via email dated September 4, 
2012, that Appellant would be seeking leave to amend the Complaint. (CT vol. 19, 
pg.4820, lines 10-12, and pp.4838-39, Exh. C, Varas Decl.) 
Luring solo practitioners such as Appellant into Respondents' advertising and 
website hosting programs in order to use their professional names and identities without 
their consent to generate additional business income constitutes misappropriation of 
identity and right to publicity. Respondents' actions have deprived Appellant of control 
over how her professional name and identity are used online, invading her privacy, 
damaging her professional reputation, and costing her income. As absurd and as brazen 
as it appears, the Respondents, apparently with a straight face, convinced the lower 
Court at the time of the hearings on summary judgment and Appellant's Motion for 
leave to file a 5AC both that the Appellant did not have any trademark rights in a 
professional name she had by then used for close to eight years, and that they would be 
prejudiced by the addition of a similar new claim that hewed even more closely to their 
version of the facts. 
Appellant's quest to obtain meaningful discovery supporting her initial causes of 
action was a David-versus-Goliath scenario in which the Respondents, corporate giants, 
fought her relentlessly every step of the way for over two years before producing any 
responsive discovery whatsoever. The Respondents metered out their responses to 
Appellant's discovery requests and only late in discovery produced modestly 
meanMgful documents and discovery responses, and that only after the lower Court 
partially granted the Appellant's Motion to Compel. After spending literally years 
searching for intellectual property counsel willing to take on these two corporate 
behemoths in a case of first impression, in August, 2012, the Appellant secured the 
assistance of an intellectual p operty specialist, Ms. SaraLynn Mandel, who spent 
seve al weeks reviewing the case and the discovery produced. Atter discussions with the 
:new -anctxisthjg courisel,._Appellant.'realized.the.extent-ofRespondente . 'Wrongftil 
:condnet,and that. her FOorth AMended- CoMplaint requited yet further aMendments and 
the addition of causes of action to properly address Respondents acts and her claims. 
These additional causes of action had beep contemplated and discussed the Respondents 
earlier, but•Appellant was in need of additional counsel to fully incorporate and present 
them to the Court. (CT p.4820, pp.10-12 Varas Decl.), Although delay has been the 
preferred tactic of the Respondents, the Appellant's reason for delay was to bring her 
new counsel up to speed. 
Perhaps not surprisingly in light of the case history the Respondents continued to 
stonewall the Appellant and her new counsel in their eftbrts to obtain further discovery, 
which was needed to demonstrate the exact nature and extent of Misuse of Appellant's 
professional name and identity, and intrusion into Appellant's privacy rights. Indeed, 
Respondent Yahoo! refused to produce a single deponent as a "person most 
knowledgeable," ("PMK") in response to Appellant's repeated requests and Motion to 
Compel, obscuring its refusal in endless demands foi meet and confers and narrowing 
the PMK inquiry to the point where the deposition would have yielded little in the 
nature of meaningful discovery on Appellant's claims. This was only the latest in a long 
history of discovery stonewalling by the Respondents. For example, Appellant did not 
receive verified responses to interrogatories and requested documents for nearly two 
years after first serving discovery on Respondent Google. 
Like Yahoo! Google was uncooperative in regard to PMKideponents, providing 
as a PMK deponent an employee who had worked at Google for only two years, who 
did not have a background in computer technology (th.e employeeihad worked•at a radio 
station p ior to taking a job at Google), who de onstrated less knowledge than even 
Appellant had about Google's system and who repeatedly sabotaged Appellant's 
counsel's attempts in the deposition to obtain answers to questions that could explain 
portions of Google's responses to Appellant's discovery requests. 
Because of the Respondents' delaying tactics, the obstacles that Appellant faced 
in her over two-and-a-half-year search for qualified counsel, the exceedingly complex 
nature of the Respondents' technology underlying their online services (which required 
a s gnificant a nount of time to learn to sufficiently to determine how Respondents' h d 
misused Appellant's business name and identity) and Respondents unceasing 
stonewalling and delay in the discovery process Appellant was not able to determine 
the amendments needed, including new causes of action, until November, 2012. 
As a matter of law, the lower Court erred in denying Appellant's MOti011 for 
Leave to File her 5AC and in granting Respondents' motions for summary judgment, in 
view of the clear severe prejudice that would result and did result from denial of 
amendment, as well as the lack of evidence of surprise or other serious prejudice to 
Respondents. (CT vol. 30, pp. 7607-7608, Order Re: Pl's Mot for IN; vol. 30, pp. 7609- 
7615, Orders Re: Defs Mots for &I) In view of the miscarriage of justice in denying 
Appellant her day in court, Appellant respectfully requests that this Court reverse the 
trial court's judgments and remand for further proceedings. 
H. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
1 0 
Appellant filed her i itial Compla nt on February 3, 2010, alleg ng counts 
relating to the misuse of her professional name by both Respondents. Appella t filed a 
First Amended Complaint on February 8, 2010. A Second Amended Complaint was 
filed on March 12, 2010. Respondents demurred to the Second Amended Complaint, 
which was sustained with leave to amend. A Third Amended Complaint was filed on 
July 19, 2010. Respondents again demurred but Appellant was granted leave to amend 
on November 4, 2010. A 4AC with six causes of action was filed on December 13, 
2010. (A copy of the 4AC can be found in CT vol. 17, pp. 4093-4174, of Evidence in 
Support of Google's Motion for Summary Judgment) Respondents again demurred, but 
were overruled with the exception of cla ms of vicarious trademark Mfringement. 
Appellant represented herself in propria persona for the first through fourth iterations of 
the Complaint. Substantive discovery responses were not provided by Respondents 
until after resolution of cross motions fbr discovery, decided in June 8, 2012 (CT vol. 
14, pp.3560-3565, Orders). 
On November 19, 2012, Appellant 11 ed a Motion for Leave to File a Fifth 
Amended Complaint with a Notice of Errata filed on November 29, 2012 (CT vol. 2 , 
pp. 5171-5964, Mot for Lv and Ntc of Err). Appellant also represented herself in 
propria persona for the Motion for Leave to File the 5AC. Appellant had retained 
intellectual property legal counsel, Ms. SaraLynn Mandel, on a limited representation 
bas s to assist Appellant Prior to the filing of the motion. 
Each Respondent filed a Motion for Summary Judgment or in the Alternative 
Summary Adjudication of all of Appellant s pending claims•on September 14, 2012 
(Respondent Yahoo!) and September 28, 2012 (Respondent Goog e) (CT vol.•15-16, 
  
pp.3837-3928, Yahoo's Mot for SJ, vol. 16, pp. 3939-4066, Google's Mot for SJ.) 
Appellant filed an Opposition to each Motion for Summary Judgment on December 24, 
2012, (CT Vol. 28, pp 7108-7156, Pl's Opp to Defs' Mots for SJ.)  
Respondents filed Oppositions to Appellant's Motion thr Leave to file the SAC 
on November 30, 2012 1 (CT vol 26, pp 6683-6989 and 6994-7007, Defs' Opps to Mot 
for Lv),The trial Court heard both the Appellant's motion to file a 5AC and the motions 
  
of both Respondents for summary judgment on January 8, 2013. The motion to file a 
SAC was denied by Order ("SAC Order') dated January 22, 2013 and filed on January 
23, 2013. (CT vol. 30, pg 7607-7608, SAC Order) Both of Respondents' motions for 
Summary Judgment were granted by Order ("SJ Order") also dated January 22, 2013 
and filed on January 23 2013. (CT vol. 30, pp. 7609-7615. SJ Order). 
In the Order denying Appellant's Mot on for Leave to File SAC ("SAC Order"), 
the Court asserted the motion was not "timely at this late stage of the litigation and 
especially in view of the pending trial date," even if a "brief continuance might have 
been granted." (CT vol. 30, p. 7607, lines 16-18, SAC Order). The trial Court further 
stated that another basis for denial was that Respondents would be prejudiced because 
they `'expended substantial expense and efforts in their defense," and would have to 
•Defendant Goo& omitted ks memorandum of Opposition in its serviceon Appellant•on November 30, 2012, but 
provided it several days later on December 3, 2012. 
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"virtually re-litigate an essentially new case starting with demurrers, discovery, and 
motions for summary judgment, as well as re-prepare for trial." (CT Nfol. 30, p. 7607, 
lines 21-24, 5AC Order). The Court also asserted there was "no legally supportable 
bases for the new causes of action. The statutes of 'limitation appear to have run." (CT 
vol. 30, p. 7607, lines 25-26, SAC Order.) The Court added that "Appellant's counsel 
acknowledged, there is no federal or state statute that Appellant can cite to support her 
new causes of action 2." (CT vol. 30, p. 7607, lines 25-28, SAC Order). The Court 
concluded that [Ajlthough the procedural defects in this motion are not the only reason 
for deny ng this mot on, in view of the history and the pending trial date, Appellant had 
the responsiblity to explain exactly why this motion should be granted. This was not 
done." (CT vol. 30 p. 7607, lines 1-3, SAC Order). 
In the Order granting both Respondents' motions for S.1, the Court stated: 
"Despite Appellant's arguments to the contrary in her oppositions and at the hearing on 
these motions, Defendants have established that all causes of action remaining in 
Appellant's 4AC depend on the assertion that the "Ison Marks" are protected 
trademarks/trade names." (CT vol. 30 p. 7610, Order). The Court continued: '13oth of 
Appellant's "Ison Marks" are descriptive terms and under both California and federal 
law Appellant has the burden of proving that they have acquired secondaty meaning 
Attorney Barry Van Sickle erred in his presentation on:APpellant'S behalf regarding StatLitoty authority for 
APpellanr s claims at the hearing on. summary,tukinent, lie later admitted that he was not sufficiently familiar 
with the case, which was true,. Appellant and her other counsel deny having ever.represented to the
. Court lack of 
statutory authority for Appellant's claims. The Court is directed the proposed SAC re: :statuory authority
- on the 
cIaims, - hut such - authority is not required, as cominon law may sapport claims, (CT XN, Seventh Claim for relief 
(Cal.CiY.Code §1710);- Sixth Claim Cal.Bus;Prof.Code . §17290; Fifth claim,. Calkiv.ode §3344). 
• before they are protected as trademarks and/or trade naxnes. The aljegations of the 4AC 
itself, Appellant's discovery responses and deposition testimony (attached as exhibits to 
the declarations of Yahoo counsel Christopher Varas and Goo& counsel Michael 
Powell) and the market survey and declaration by Hal Poret (presented by Yaho& but 
also relied on by Go ogle) are sufficient to establish: 1) that all of Appellants remaMing 
claims are based on and depend upon the allegation that her 'Ison Marks are protected 
trademarks/trade names; 2) that Appellant has no evidence either of her Ison Marks," 
which are both pla nly descriptive ter s have acquired any secondary meaning, and; 3) 
admissible evidence- the survey by Mr. Poret of the most relevant market area-
establishes that the "Ison Marks" have not acquired secondary meaning in the minds of 
the public in that most relevant market area. (CT vol. 30, p. 7612, lines 22-28, and p. 
7613, lines 1-7 S.1 Order.) 
However, Business and Professions Code § 14205(e)(3), read in conjunction wi h 
California Code of Civil Procedure § 473(c) and well-established case law, make clear 
that the trial Court improperly shifted the burden of proof to the Appellant to establish 
secondary meaning in her professional name, which, as we will see, when considered in 
the light most favorable to the Appellant, should already have been treated by the trial 
Court as established. The judgments in favor of the Respondents must be reversed. 
111. STATEMENT OF APPEALABILITY 
Appellant appeals the final juclgments of Santa Clara County Superior Court entered on 
February 8 2013 in Case No. 1-10-163032 in favor of Respondents pursuant to 
California Code of Civil Procedure § 904.1(a)(1). 
IV. STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The Appellant has common law rights to he professional na c in California by 
virtue of the marks eligibility for protection and the Appellant's status as the senior user 
of the marks, which she has used continuously and exclusively since 2004, when she 
opened her clinical psychology practice. The Appellant has done extensive searches and 
has not found anyone else who shares her name and also has a Ph.D. Her marks are 
unique and distinctive designations of the source of the Appellant' s various 
psychological services. The Appellant has invested hundreds of thousands of dollars in 
her education and private practice, including continuing education for professional 
development and advertising and marketing in order to increase public awareness of her 
services. the Appellant has advertised through a variety of media,' including on the 
Internet n pr nt and in telephone directories. The Appellant is well known within the 
geographic area of the San Francisco Bay Area where she works as a provider of high-
quality psychological services. The Appellant has received calls from places as far away 
as Taiwan and Africa, so public awareness of the Appellant s work in the field of 
clinical psychology extends far beyond the boundaries of the immediate area in which 
the Appellant works. 
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Through the Appellant's actions, and because of favorable public acceptance and 
recognition, the Appellant s professional marks have become distinctive designations of 
the source of origin of the Appellant's services- there is no other Carla Ison, PhA).. As a 
solo practitioner, her trade name represents the Appellant, her services, and goodwill. 
SMce she has been practicing continuously for over live years, the Appellant's 
professional name has developed secondary meaning amongst those searching for 
psychological services in the San Francisco Bay Area and Northern California. 
According to Sussex Publishers, LLC, who own and operate PsychologyToday.com , 
which is a website on which the Appellant has been advertising since 2004, over 
100,500 searches have been conducted on the area (i.e. Mountain View and adjacent 
communities) webpages on which the Appellant has posted her advertisement over the 
past four and a half years—and this is on just one website. 
In addition to having an online presence, the Appellant is also known in Bay 
Area medical, psychotherapeutic, and religious communities as a result of the clinical 
work and volunteer activities in which she has been involved. These activities have 
included the following: clinical work at Good Samaritan Hospital in Los Gatos, Santa 
Clara County Medical Center in San Jose, Kaiser Permanente in South San Francisco, 
the San Mateo County Medical and Mental Health Centers in San Mateo, and the Adult 
and Child Guidance Center in San Jose; presentations on various psychological topics at 
community centers in Mountain View and Palo Alto; attendance in continuing education 
courses held at various Bay Area venues, such as at Stanford University and the Palo 
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Alto and Menlo Park Veterans Administration facilities, and the C.G. Jung Institute in 
San Francisco; participation in events and programs offered by local professional and 
other organizations, such as the Santa Clara County Psychological Association and the 
Stanford-based branch of the San Francisco Psychoanalytic institute and Society; 
attendance in grand rounds at Stanford University and El Camino Hospitals; 
participation in groups at local churches and work with a local Christian counseling 
center; and volunteer work at the Veterans Administ ation in Palo Alto, at the Stanford 
Advanced Medicine Center, Menlo Park Presbyterian Church, and Opportunities 
Industrialization Center West (now JobTrain) in Menlo Park. 
Throughout the 25 years that Appellant has resided in the Bay Area, Appellant 
has established relationships with many members of the local community, particularly in 
Mountain View where she has her private practice. Although the Appellant did her best 
to utilize the advertising and web hostMg services of the Respondents to grow her 
practice doing business with the Respondents became a nightmare, as her attempts at 
marketing her business through the Respondents' services led to her professional name 
being used •across the Internet by various third parties to whom she had never, given 
permission to do any such thing. At no time did she give the Respondents any 
permission, authority, or license to use or sell the right to use the Appellant's marks for 
the promotion of the goods and services of third parties, either directly or indirectly-
particularly third parties who have nothing to do with the Appellant's practice, who 
compete with the Appellant, or who defame the Appellant's name and put her at risk of 
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potential profess oi al misconduct, or at the very•least force her to monitor the illicit use 
of her professional name on an almost constant basis, 
Furthermore, Appellant had no idea that once she became involved with 
Respondents through their services, she would not be able to extricate herself horn their 
fraudulent arrangement with unscrupulous third-party website owners, or that 
Respondents would be willing to spend millions of dollars to defend their right" to not 
only keep the misuse of Appellant's name going, but also to prevent Appellant from 
even learning what the identities of the unscrupulous third parties were. CompoundMg 
the problem is the fact that, because the Respondents, particularly Google, provide the 
  
most widely used means of conducting Internet searches. Appellant is actually 
dependent upon Respondents for successful promotion of her private practice. For this 
reason, Court action to protect Appellant's right to practice without undue interference, 
including retaliation by Respondents, is critical. 
The ev dence clearly shows that Respondents have sold to third-party advertisers 
the "right" to use the Appellant's marks or terms confusingly similar thereto as part of 
the Respondents' search engine-based programs, regardless of who the third parties 
have been. The Respondents' programming utilizes the expressed interest of Internet 
users in the Appellant's professional name to trigger advertisements and other search 
results containing links to websites that are not the Appellant's website, or authorized by 
the Appellant to use the Appellant's trade name. In many cases, these websites are 
highly inappropriate. For example the Appellant has frequently seen her marks 
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associated with advertisements for websites that offer prison records (CT vol. 17, 
p.4139, Exh.3, Evid in Supp of Google's Mot for S.D. For the court's information, the 
Appellant made inquiries with the local police and was told that no one with the 
Appellan 's professional name has ever served time in prison or even had a police 
record. The Appellant never authorized the Respondents to sell or in any way offer , the 
right to use the Appellant's marks in commerce to draw web users to these or other 
milar inappropriate websites. Nevertheless, these unauthorized search results appear.i ii 
close and confusing proximity to legitimate search results containing links to the. 
Appellant's websitc. Many of these unauthorized search results use the Appellant's 
marks in whole or in part within the title and text of the search results themselves. 
Use of Appellant's marks as keyword triggers in third-party advertising programs 
and in search results that drive consumer traffic to third-party vvebsites allow 
Respondents and their advertising and ad-hosting clients to benefit financially from, and 
trade off, the Appdlant's goodwill and reputation without incurring the expense that the 
Appellant has incurred in building up name recognition. "Ibrough these practices, the 
Respondents traffic in the infringement and dilution of the Appellant's marks, and 
falsely represent or confusingly suggest to consumers a connection to the Appellant that 
does not exist These practices cause consumer confusion, erode the distinctiveness of 
the Appellant's marks, and cause the Appellant to lose the control to which she is 
entitled over the commercial use of the Appellant's marks by placing such control in the 
hands of the Respondents and their advertisers, as well as other search engine operato s 
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who use the Respondents' search•engine technology, The Appellant included a small 
number of the infringing activities she had discovered as exhibits to her initial and 
subsequent Complaints. 
As noted, supra, the Respondents' programming creates "Sponsored Links" and 
other search results that either use terms that are confusingly similar
, to the Appellant's 
marks or are formatted in ways that are likely to cause confusion with her trade na e 
marks. It is indisputably the intent of Respondents' advertising programs to provide 
unprecedented exposure for the goods and services of advertising and wébsitehostiñg 
customers, such as Plaintiff Unfortunately, in addition, without adequately disclosing 
the risks, Respondents also use the names, trademarks and goods and services provided 
by customers, such as Plaintiff, who avail themselves of Respondents' programs and 
tools, to misdirect consumers to the websites and advertisements of individuals and 
entities not affiliated with, endorsed, sponsored, or approved or authorized by the 
Plaintiff and other customers. Moreover, some of these websites and advertisements 
with which custome s are linked are scandalous or otherwise embarrassing, and, 
regardless of their content, most do not contain any reference even to the customers, or 
hisfherfit's goods and services. 
The Respondents have altered their Internet advertising program descriptions and 
instructions repeatedly, yet the descriptions and instructions remain confusing and 
insufficient to adequately warn their customers, such as Plaintiff, of these risks. 
Respondents do not provide any explicit warnings to their customers of usks associated 
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with using Respondents' services in. particular the risk of associaUön of the customer's 
name and services with unrelated and undesirable content throughout the Internet, 
Because the nature of the indexes compiled by the Respondents utilize the number o 
linkages to a particular page to determine relevance, so-called "natural" search, the 
sponsored ads often contribute to an unhealthy feedback loop for customers such as the 
Appellant. For example, the Respondents have advertising programs, such as "AdSense" 
program, which make similar commercial use of the Appellant's marks or terms 
confusingly similar thereto in order to trigger advertisements on third parties' websites 
throughout the Internet. In at least some of these instances, the title andfor text of these 
advertisements also make use of the Appellant's marks or terms confusingly similar 
thereto, which confuses the public at large via misleading ads and misleading natural" 
search, 
In summary, the Respondents' trade name policies constitute, in practice, use in 
commerce of the registered and common law trade names of others , including 
common-law trade names, "Carla Ison, PhD.' and "www.carlaisonphd.com ," with full 
knowledge that consumers are likely to be confused and lured away from the websites 
that they intended to visit, and with the goal of financially benefiting the Respondents to 
the detriment of the Appellant and other trade name and service mark owners. Due to 
the discovery debacle detailed supra, it is still unclear to what extent the Respondents' 
keyword suggestion tool has played a role in the abuse of the Appellant's professional 
•trade name. 
Appellant sustained enormous personal and professional damages resulting from 
Respondents' misuse of her narne and marks, and further from Respondents' failure to 
take reasonable steps to remove injurious, unauthorized uses of Appellants name and 
trademarks from the Respondents' advertis ng systems within a reasonable amount of 
time afte Appellant notified Respondents of the problem. The harm to the Appellant 
has included not only loss of Appellant's ability to market her services to consumers but 
also loss of a significant number of patients and potential patients affiliated (whom 
Appellant has had to refer to other therapists in order to avoid potential conflicts of 
interest because of the patients and potential patients' affiliation with Respondents); 
networking opportunities in the health care community; professional contacts and 
friends on account of their fear of retaration by the Respondents; opportunities to 
contribute to journal and newspaper articles; an opportunity to create an Internet-based 
health care program; a company advisory board position; and educational opportunities 
to further her career for which Appellant had been preparing for decade prior to the 
lawsuit. 
Over two and half years prior to the filing of this lawsuit Appel ant expended 
considerable, repeated effort to contact the Respondents to request that they remove and 
prevent unauthorized uses of Appellants trademarks by third parties within Defendant's 
advertising systems. Even after this lawsuit was filed in February, 2010, the 
infringement of the Appellant's trademark by the Respondents' or their advertising 
partners continued. The Appellant has found evidence of abuse of her name and 
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trademark on Respondent Yahoors website as recently as July 14, 2012, and on 
Google's website as recently as October 2 2012, Appellant discontinued using 
Respondent Yahoors web hosting services in 2012 and Respondent Google s 
advertising services in 2009. However, as noted supra, the infringing activity continued 
long after that. 
The Respondents have been vvell aware of the risks of trademark infringement 
and harm from association of their advert sing customers' names and marks with 
unapp oved third party's products and services on the Internet, via their advertising 
programs, for years. Yet, in their terms of use contracts, they intentionally concealed 
material facts and intentionally disclosed only vague references regarding the potential 
of unauthorized and objectionable uses of her name and trademarks by third parties, as a 
result of her participation in their respective advertising and website hosting progra ms-
ieferenccs that in no vay prepared the Appellant for the barrage of online associations 
of her name and trademarks with unrelated products and services. 
Respondents knew, but intentionally did not adequately disclose in their contracts 
: orl.their promotions describing their services, the degree of unassociated online content 
that was likely to arise as a direct result of Appellant's participation in their advertising 
and website hosting progran s, or the fact that once the Appellant's information became 
ensnared in the Respondents' online schemes, there would be no way out. To make 
matters infinitely worse, Respondents either cannot or will not remedy the harm caused 
by their misuse of their advertising custo er's names and trademarks. Obviously, the 
Respondents' have sole control of their advettising systems and can reasonably be 
expected to be capable of monitoring and controlling every aspect.of those systems to 
website as recently as July 14, 2012, and on Respondent Google's website as recently as 
September 3, 2012. 
Plaintiff has lost and is continuing to lose the ability to attract those patients. By 
reason of the above, Defendants have violated the Plaintiffs exclusive rightsin and to 
the use of the registered trademarks 'Carla Ison, Ph.D.," "Carla C.s Ison, Ph.D." 
"www.carla onphd.com and variations thereof, and have contributed to the v olation 
of such rights by others by enabling, cooperating with, suggesting, and encouraging the 
use of Plaintiffs trademarks by others, and may be held liable in a civil action under the 
common law of the State of California and relevant provisions of the California Model 
Trademark Act, Califbmia Business Provisions Code § 14200 et sequentes. 
A. APPELLANT'S FOURTH AMENDED COMPLAINT 
Appellant's claims for relief in the 4AC w re: 
Count 1: First Claim for Relief for Common Law Trade Name/Service Mark 
Infringement; 
Count 2: Second Claim for Relief for Contributory Trade Name/Service Mark 
Infringement under the Common Law; 
Count 3: Third Claim for Relief for Vicarious Trade Name/Service Mark 
Infringement under the Common Law; 
Count 4: Fourth Claim for Relief for Dilution under the Com on Law; 
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Count 5: Fifth Claim for Relief for Misappropriation under, Californ a I.,aw; 
Count 6: Sixth Claim for Relief Money Had and Received; and 
Count 7: Seventh Claim for Relief for Violation of California Bus ness and 
Professions Code for Unfair Competition Under California Law. 
(CT vol.17, p. 4093, 4AC), 
B. APPELLANT'S PROPOSED FIFTH AMENDED COMPLAINT 
The claims for relief in Appellant's proposed SAC were: 
Count 1: First Claim for Relief for Common Law Trade Name/Service Mark 
Infringement; 
Count 2: Second Claim for Relief for Contributory Trade Name/Service Mark 
Infringement under the Common Law; 
Count 3: Third Claim for Relief tbr Trademark Dilution under the Common 
LaN ; 
Count 4: Fourth Claim for Relief fOr Commercial Misappropriation under 
California Common Law; 
Count 5: Fifth Claim for Relief for Statutory Misappropriation Pursuant to Civil 
Code §3344; 
Count 6: Sixth Claim for Relief for Unfair Trade Practices in Vio ation of 
California Business and Professions Code §17200; 
Count 7: Seventh Claim for Relief for Fraudulent and Deceitful Concealment 
under California Civil Code §1710; 
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Count 8: Eighth Claim for Relief for Negligence, or in the. Al ernative 
Recklessness; and 
Count 9: Ninth Claim for Relief for Negligent Interference with Prospective 
Economic; Relations. 
(CT vol. 21, pp. 5171-5669, 5AC). 
The 5AC included the facts origina ly pled in support of the claims for relief in 
the 4AC and added facts obtained through discovery and research 
4AC was filed in 2010. 
V. STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
conducted since the 
  
A. LEGAL STANDARDS FOR APPELLATE REVIEW OF DENIAL OF 
LEAVE TO AMEND A COMPLAINT 
On appeal, denial of leave to amend is reviewed de novo, as to whether a cause •of• 
action was stated as a matter, of law, and applying th abuse of discretion standard to 
review the trial court's denial of leave to amend. Montclair Parkowners Ann v. City of 
Montclair (1999) 76 CalApp.4th 784, 790. 
In Mesler v. Bragg Management Ca the California. Supreme Court explained the 
role of an appellate court in reviewing a trial court's denial of leaye to amend as lbllows: 
"When a request to amend has been denied, an appellate court is confronted by two 
conflicting policies. On the one hand, the trial coures discretion should not be disturbed 
unless it has been clearly abused; on the other, there is a strong pOlicy in favor of liberal 
allowance of amendments. This conflict is often resolved in favor of the privilege of 
amending, and reversals are common where the appellant makes a reasonable showing 
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of prejudice from the ruling." Mesler v. Bragg Mgmt. co., 39 Cal. 3d 290, 293 (1985) 
(quoting 3 Witkin, Cal. Procedure, Pleading, § 1042 (2d ed. 1971). 
B. LEGAL STANDARDS FOR GRANTING LEAVE TO AMEND A 
COMPLAINT 
Leave to amend is liberally granted regardless of the number of previous 
atte pts. West v. JPMargan Chase Bank, NA, 214 Cal. App. 4th 780, 806 (2013) 
(court liberally construed Appellant's third amended complaint); Lockton v. O'Rourke, 
184 Cal. App. 4th 1051, 1060 (2010) (Appellant allowed to amend complaint five 
times); Stevenson v. San Francisco Hous. Autk , 24 Cal. App. 4th 269, 284 (1994) (had 
amended her complaint seven times); Stansfield v. Starkey, 220 Cal. App. 3d 59, 76 
(1990) (Appellants had been granted leave to amend their complaint five times); Winrz v, 
McCulloch Corp. ,60 Cal. App.3d 663, 672 (1976) (reversing judgment of dismissal and 
allowing Appellants to file a sixth amended complaint), 
The liberal policy of permitting amendment at any stage of proceedings has 
included amendments permitted during the trial. California Code of Civil Procedure § 
576 provides that 'at any time betbre or after commencement of trial," a judge may 
allow the amendment of any pleading 'in the ftirtherance of justice," McDougald v. 
Hulet, 64 P.2d 278 (Cal. 1901). It is an abuse of discretion to deny amendment 
-"'where 
the refusal also results in a party being deprived of the right to assert a meritorious cause 
of action or a meritorious defense." Williams v Braslow, (1986) 179 Cal.App.3d 762, 
774,)(reversing summary judgment and remanding to allow Appellant to file a fifth 
amended complaint) Youngman v. Nevada Irrigation Dist. (1969)i, 70 Ca1.2d 240, 245; 
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Bt.trkle v. Burkle (2006) 141 Cal.App.4th 1029, 1042 (trial court er ed in denying leave 
to amend complaint to add new claims after Appellant raised triable issues regardMg 
facts supporting new claims in opposit on to defendant's summary judgment motion.) 
If the original pleading has not framed the issues in an articulate and precise 
manner, an Appellant should not be precluded from having a trial on the merits." Honig 
v. Financial Corp. of America (1992) 6 Cal.App.4th 960, 965. More bluntly, the "right 
of a party to amend to correct inadvertent misstatements of facts or erroneous 
allegations of terms cannot be denied." Blakey v. Superior Court (1984) 153 Cal.App.3d 
101, 107. In deciding a motion for summary judgment where an Appellant proposes to 
amend the complaint, the trial court should instead ''review those allegations the party 
proposes to add to the complaint  to cure existing deficiencies, and determine whether 
the proposed additions would be sufficient to survive summary judgment!' Itansra v. 
Superior Court, (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 630 647. 
While "sham pleadings omitting an incurable defect in the ease," are not proper, 
the 'Mules of pleading are conveniences to promote justice and not to impede or warp 
it. We do not question the rule that all allegations of fact in a verified complaint, which 
are subsequently ot itted or contradicted, are still binding on the complainant. 'Ile rule 
is valid and useful, but it does not exist in 
 a vacuum and cannot be mechanically 
applied. It is a good rule to defeat abuses of the privilege to amend and to discourage 
sham and untruthful pleadings. It is not a rule, however, which is intended to prevent 
honest complainants from correcting erroneous allegations of generic terms which may 
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have legal implications but which are also loosely used by laymen or to prevent the 
correction of ambiguous statements of fact." Contreras v. Blue Cross of California 
(1988) 199 Cal.App.3d 945, 949, 950. The "sham pleading rule" should not be applied 
in a case such as this, where the Appellant seeks to change his legal theory of recovery 
and the legal conclusions he seeks to draw from underlying factual events, and also 
seeks to omit factual allegations that are irrelevant and immaterial to the new legal 
theor es asserted. Amarel v. Connell, 202 Cal, App. 3d 137, 145. 
Serious prejudice to the Appellant caused by the reject on of a proposed amended 
complaint is paramount in determining whether a trial court abused its discretion when 
denying Appellant permission to amend. For example, denial of leave to amend 
constitutes an abuse of discretion where the new allegations in the proposed amended 
complaint•are integral to Appellant's theory of recovery and will not unfairly surprise 
the defendant. Prejudice to a defendant only ar ses when a defendant is "surprised" by 
the allegations in the proposed amended complaint. Ranier v. Cmt,V. Mem'l Hosp. 18 
Cal. App. 2d 240, 255 (1971) (Trial court abused its discretion in denying leave to 
amend the complaint during trial where Respondents did not claim that they we e 
surprised by the new theory alleged.) 
Examples of prejudice include where the opposing party has lost the opportunity 
to assert certain legal rights or undertake protective legal action that would have been 
available if the amendment were presented earlier; or where the opposing party 
demonstrates that as a result of delay important information has been irretrievably lost 
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because of destroyed evidence or missing witnesses. • Cota v. County of Los Angeles, 
105 Cal.App.3d 282, 288 (1980) cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1014 0989. Even when the case 
has been set for trial then continued, delay alone will not constitute prejudice sufficient 
to justify denial of leave to amend. 3 Witkin, Cal. Procedure, Pleading, § 1042 (2d Ed. 
1971) 
C. RELATION BACK OF AMENDMENTS TO A COMPLAINT 
An amended complaint is considered a new action •tbr purposes of the statut of 
limitations only if the claims do not "relate back" to an earlier, timely-filed complaint. 
Under the relation-back doctrine, an amendment relates back to the original complaint if 
the amendment: (1) rests on the same general set of facts; (2) invo ves the same injury; 
and (3) refers to the same instrumentality. Norgart v. Upjohn Co. (1999) 21 CalAth 
383, 408-409; Austin v. Massachusetts Bonding & insurance Co, (1961) 56 Ca1.2d 596, 
600. An amended complaint relates back to an earlier complaint if it is based on the 
same general set of facts, even if the Appellant alleges a different legal theory or new 
cause of action. Kittredge Sports Co. v. Superior Court (1989) 213 Cal.App.3d 1045. 
1048; klding v. North Bay Construction Ca (1995) 39 Cal.App.4th 1111, 1113. 
In determining whether the amended complaint alleges facts that are sufficiently 
similar to those alleged in the original complaint, the critical inquiry is whether the 
defendant had adequate notice of the claim based on the original pleadinge. was not 
"surprised. Garrison v, Board of Directors (1995) 36 Cal.App.4th 1670, 1678; Benfield 
17. Mocatta Metals Corp, (2d Cir.1994) 26 F.3d 19, 23. The test looks to fair notice to 
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the defendant. If there is sufficient commonality between the original and the amended 
complaints to avoid unfair surprise, then relation back is appropriate. Pointe San Diego 
Residential Community, L.P., 195 Cal App.4th 265, 276-77 (4th pist.2011) Ultimately, 
in applying the relation-back doctrine, courts should prioritize the "strong policy n this 
state that cases should be decided on their merits." Idding, supra, 39.Ca1App.4th at p. 
1114. 
•11•REVIEW OF GRANTS OF MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
A single triable issue of fact defeats a motion for summary judgment. Respondents 
are entitled to summary judgment only if gall the papers submitted show that there is no 
triable issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as 
a matter of law." Code of Civil Procedure, § 437(c) To determine whether triable issues 
of fact do ex st, the Court independently reviews the record Johnson v. American 
Standard, Inc. (2008) 43 Ca1.4th 56, 64. The Court must view the evidence in the light 
most favorable to Appellant as the losing party, resolving all evidentiary doubts and 
ambiguities in her favor. (id.) The Court must liberally construe eVidence in the 
plaintiffs favor and strictly against the Respondent's to determine, whether defendant 
has shown that Appellant has not established a prima facie case, a showing that would 
forecast the inevitability of a nonsuit" Saelzler v Advanced Group 400, 25 Ca.1.4th 763, 
768 (2004) Since Business and Professions Code § 14205(e)(3) states that continuo is 
and exclusive use of a professional personal trade name for a period of five years is 
sufficient evidence of secondary meaning, and all ambiguity must be re olved m the 
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Appellant's favor, the existence of secondary meaning in the Appellant's professional 
narne, is, as a matter of law, a triable issue of fact in the case. If the Respondents don't 
like it they' e welcome to petition their representatives. 
It is worth noting that even assuming, arguendo, that the Appellant has not 
established a single triable issue of fact in support of her trade ark claims, summary 
judgment would still have been inappropriate. In the event of easily cognizable 
unpleaded claims, granting summary judgment based on mistaken legal conclusions in 
the complaint would still be improper, Kirby v. Albert D. Seeno donstruction Co. (1992) 
11 Cal.App.4th 1059, 1068. By granting summary judgment and denying leave to 
amend to add si pler claims already supported by the facts in the,operative Complaint 
(not to mention newly discove ed defendants), the trial Court wrongfully denied the 
Appellant her day ml Court. 
VL ARGUMENT 
This Court must determine whether the lower Court abused its discretion in 
denying Appellant's motion for leave to amend her 4AC, Because the trial court 
provided no reasoned decis on justifying denial of Appellant's motion for leave to 
amend and there was an absence of Prejudice to Respondents, but serious prejudice to 
the Appellant, the trial Court abused its discretion and this Court must reverse. 
A. IT WAS A CLEAR ABUSE OF DISCRETION FOR THE TRIAL COURT 
TO DENY APPELLANT LEAVE TO AMEND 
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There can be no clearer example of circumstances warranting a reversal of a 
lower Court's refusal to permit amendment of a complaint than in the case at band. 
Appellant faced motions for summary judgment from both Respondents that were based 
on the very alleged deficiencies that Appellant sought to remedy by amendment to her 
Complaint. It was a foregone conclusion that Appellant would not be able to adequately 
oppose the Respondents motions for summary judgment in the absence of amendments 
to the 4AC. 
In its Order granting Respondents motions for summary judgment, the lower 
Court stated that both motions "primarily argue that the -Ison Marks" do not qualify for 
trademark/tradename protection, '(CT vol. 30, p,7610, lines 3-4, SJ Order). The Court 
also declared that -each of Appellant's remaining causes of action also contain language 
making it clear that all of them arise from and depend on Appellant's allegations that the 
clson Marks" are protected trademarks/trade names." (CT vol. 30, p. 7611, lines 17-19 
S.1 Order). In fact, Appellant referred to misuse of her name six tiMes in her 4AC. 
Furthermore, Appellant had properly submitted a Motion for leave to amend the 4AC 
prior to the hearings on Respondents motions for summary judgment and months 
before the scheduled trial date. Appellant's proposed 5AC included allegations of fact 
based on evidence obtained from Respondents belated responses to ongoing discovery 3, 
3 At the time of the decision on Respondents' Motions for Summary Judgment, Appellant had been unable to 
obtain depositions of appropriate representatives of Respondents' corpOrations as "pirsons most knowledgable," 
despite repeated attempts to do so, In addition, Appellant had been limited in discovery by the Court, to narrow 
fields of inquiry excludMg information regarding the manner in which her business name and identity were 
promoted to third parties in both Respondents' advertising campaigns. 
3 .3: 
that clarified that certain claims were not reliant on whether Appel ant possessed 
  
trademark rights, with all proposed chariges arising out of the same general facts alleged 
in each previous iteration of her Complaint. 
B. THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED- ITS-D1SCRETION IN DENYING 
APPELLANT LEAVE TO AMEND THE 4AC 
I. APPELLANT'S MOTION FOR LEAVE TO AMEND WAS NOT 
UNTIMELY 
The trial court failed to provide sufficient reasons or reasoning supporting its 
holding that Appellant's Motion for Leave to File the Fifth Amended Complaint 
("Motion for Leave") was untimely. (CT vol. 30, pp. 7607, lines 16-17, Order). 
Appellant's Motion for Leave was filed November 19, 2013 4, with three (3) months left 
before the trial date of February 11, 2013. While the e was a period of time between the 
filing of the 4AC and the Appellant's Motion for Leave, Respondents had not 
commenced providing substantive responses to discovery until June of 2013. In fact, 
discovery was ongoing even at the time of the hearings on Appellant's Motion for Leave 
and Respondents' Motions for Summary Judgment. In addition, Appellant had just 
retained Ms. SaraLynn Mandel, a registered patent attorney in Southern California with 
expertise in patents, trademarks, copyrights, and e-commerce, to represent her in August 
of 2013, 
4 Appellant also filed a Notice of Errata on November 20, 2013, with some corrections.(CT vol. 23, p.5702) 
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As was stated earlier, Appdiant's counsel commenced representation in the midst 
of active discovery with multiple deadlines and demands from both corporate 
Respondents represented by teams of attorneys. She also had to review voluminous files 
while trying to accommodate the existing deadlines. (CT vol,21, pp.5188-5189, Mandel 
Decl in support of Pl's Mot for Lv). Appellant's new counsel recognized that 
APPellant's cause of action in the 4AC required clarification and that the alleged facts 
supported new causes of action, but it took her time to review the evidence and 
formulate revisions to the 4AC. Had Respondents cooperated with the spirit and 
substance of discove y responses, as mandated by the discovery rules of this State, 
Appellant could have brought her motion for leave substantially earlier. 
Respondents' assertions in their Oppositions to Appellant's Motion for Leave to 
File a Fifth Amended Complaint that Appellant's alleged delay in:seeking leave to tile a 
SAC was in "bad faith" or "without explanation," are devoid of merit and are 
insufficient to justify denial of Appellant's proposed amendments to her complaint. (CT 
vol.26, p. 6688, lines 13-24, Google Opp; and vol.27, p.6707, Yahoo! Opp,) If 
Defendant Yahoo! was attempting to suggest that the proposed SAC was a "sham 
pleading," the record is devoid of any facts suggesting Appellant was untruthful, or 
acted in bad faith, as a "layperson" attempting to assert causes of action based on the 
facts alleged. ...." Berman v, Bromberg, 65 Cal. Rptr, 2d 773, 781-84 (1997). Not only 
was there no delay by the Appellant in seeking leave to amend once she began receiving 
discovery from Respondents and retained new counsel, leave to amend a complai t can 
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be sought even during trial, and regardless of the number of times the complaint has 
been previously amended. West v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, 214 Cal. App. 4th 780, 806; 
CCP §576. Moreover, Respondents had been on notice since at least September 2012, 
less than one month alter Appellant retained new counsel, that amendment of the 4AC 
would be sought. (CT ; p,7327, lines 14-16, vol. 29, Mandel Decl.) Respondents did not 
and could not assert "surprise" in opposition to Appellant's motion for leave to amend. 
Ranier v. Only. Mem? Hosp., 18 Cal„App. 2d 240, 255 (1971). 
The period of time between Respondents finally producing documents and 
Appellant's filing of her Motion for Leave in November, 2013, a period of at most four 
(4) months, is not a significant "delay' justifying denial of the Motion for Leave, 
particularly in view of the lack of surprise or other prejudice to Respondents, and the 
prejudice caused to Appellant. 
2. WHILE APPELLANT HAS BEEN SEVERELY PREJUDICED BY THE 
DENIAL OF LEAVE TO AMEND, ANY PREJUDICE TO RESPONDENTS 
WAS NEGLIGIBLE 
a. Neither Defendant Was Surprised" nor Otherwise Demonstrated Serious 
Prejudice 
Courts in California have permitted amendment OICOMplat.111S, even during trial, 
where the prejudice caused to an Appellant outweighs prejudice that may be caused to a 
Defendant from any delays, including from subsequent demurrers; The types of 
prejudice to a Defendant that might rise to a level justifYMg denial of leave to amend 
include where the Defendant is surprised by proposed claims, or loses an opportunity to 
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assert a legal right or take legal action to protect itself; or evidence "is irretrievably lost" 
because the amendment sought was not presented earlier. Ranier v. Grnty. Mem? Hosp., 
18 Cal. App. 2d 240, 255 (1971); Cota v. County ofLos Angeles, 105 CaLApp3d 282, 
288 (1980). 
Both Respondents opposed Appellant's motion for leave and argued prejudice, 
but neither Defendant asserted surprise. (CT vo1.26, pp.6683-6702; 6703-6721, 
Google's Opp. Pl. Mot. Leave; Yahoo's Opp Pl. Mot. Leave). Indeed, it is clear from 
both Respondents' oppositions that they were well aware that Appellant was going to 
request leave to amend her complaint. For example, Defendant Google argued in its 
Declaration in Opposition to Appellant's Motion for Leave that it would be prejudiced 
by a delay in trial and need to conduct discovery and file a demurrer because it would 
have to "reengineer its trial strategy." (Google Opp.Mot.Leave, mpra, p. 1, 21-24). 
However, Google also argued that Appellant had allegedly '''anticipated seeking leave to 
add new claims since June 2010," (CT vol.26, p.6688, Google Opp.,lines 14 15). 
Similarly, Defendant Yahoo!. did not assert that it was taken by surprise by any of 
Appellant's revised and new claims for relief in the proposed SAe, asserting that 
Appellant had allegedly informed it of an intent to add new claims between June 2, 
2010 and August 1, 2012." (CT vol.26, p.6716, Yahoo! Opp., lines 17-18). 
b. Any Alleged Delay or Inconvenience was not Prejudicial to Respondents 
Respondents asserted in their Oppositions that Appellant Unreasonably delayed 
seeking to•amend the 4AC, causing prejudice to the Respondents. However, not only 
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were Appellant's alleged assertions of an ntent to amend made before Appellant had 
retained intellectual property counsel, it s undisputed •by either Defendant that 
responses to discovery did not commence until after June 15, 2012. (CT vol.26, p.6691, 
Google Opp., lines 4-5). Appellant did not have the information available to assess her 
causes of action further, until after she was able to review discovery and have her new 
counsel do so starting in August of 2012. The only conclusion that flows from 
Respondents arguments in their Opposition is that both Respondents could not have 
been surprised when Appellant moved for leave to file the SAC. 
Moreover, neither Defendant asserted that witnesses or evidence were lost or 
otherwise unavailable, or that they would not be able to undertake, any needed legal 
protective action. Cola v. County of Los Angeles, supra. Rather, yaho& asserted that 
the "allegations and claims against it in the 5AC were "not made . n good faith." (CT. 
vol. 26, p.6711, Yahoo's Opposition to Appellant's Motion for Leave to File Fifth 
Amended Complaint, p. 5, lines 7-13.) In addition to the absence of precedent 
supporting "lack of good faith" as a reason to deny amendment, Yaho& then provided 
factual allegations from Appellant's proposed 5AC, that Yahoot disputes, in support of 
Appellant's alleged "bad faith." Yahoo's contentions regarding alleged bad faith are not 
a proper basis for den al of leave to file an amended compla'nt. EVen if there were such 
a. basis, the fact that Appellant alleges facts that Yahoo! disputes does not establish bad 
faith- it demonstrates that the parties don't agree on the facts. 
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Yahoo! also argued in its Opposition, that it would be "severely prejudiced" 
because the motion was filed on the "eve of trial." (CT vol.26, Yahoo! Opp. P. 12, lines 
6 to 8). As set forth above, motions for leave to amend even during trial am considered 
timely and as such the timing does not in itself establish prejudice, Cal.Code Civ. Proc. 
§ 576. The "severe" prejudice advanced by Yahoo! was that because the proposed SAC 
had a new cause of action, it would require further discovery and entail increased cost 
and a need to "revise its tr al strategy.' (CT vol.26, p.6718,Yahool Opp., lines 9-16). 
Proposed addition by an Appellant of new causes of action or even new theories of 
liability to a complaint 's not a proper basis for denying leave to amend a complaint 
where the opposing party is not surprised. idding v. North Bay Construction Co. (1995) 
39 Cal.App.4th at 1113. 
The possibility that a set trial date will be postponed, or thai a defendant will be 
inconvenienced by having to de ur or perform additional discovery- the main argument 
advanced by both Respondents in their Opposition to Appellants Motion for Leave- is 
not sufficient reason to deny a Appellant the right to amend a comPlaint. Yet the lovv -er 
Court's denial was based on these two possibilities; that the trial d'ate might need to be 
continued, and that Respondents would be inconvenienced, because, essentially, the 
litigation would continue. (CT vol.30, p, 7607, Order, lines 17, 21-24). 
The need for an opposing party to spend more time and funds litigating is not 
sufficient prejudice, and certainly not the type of "severe prejudice" that would merit the 
denial of amendment of the 4AC to permit Appellant to defend against both 
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Respondents' motions for summaiy judgment. The Courts in California hold directly to 
the contrary, particularly where the defendant has no basis for asserting that it was 
"surprised" by the proposed amendments to the complaint. Berman v. Bromberg, 56 
Cal.App.4th 936, 939. 
ce Appellant was Severely Prejudiced from Denial of Leave to File a 5AC 
In contrast, the prejudice to Appellant, readily foreseeable at the time the lower 
Court denied the Motion for Leave, in view of Respondents' pending notions for 
summary judgment, and which subsequently occurred, was substantial and irreparable, 
Appellant was unable to adequately defend against Respondents' motions for summary 
judgment, because the 4AC did not clearly state her causes of action independent of 
trademark rights, and did not include claims for additional legal theories based on the 
previously alleged facts. The trial court also had the proposed amendments to the 4AC 
before it, providing clearly stated causes of action not dependent on whether Appellant 
had trademark rights, as well as alleged facts supporting elements Of each cause of 
action. 
Respondents ultimately obtained summary judgment on all of Appellant's claims 
in her 4AC, based on their argument that all of Appellant's claims in that 4AC relied on 
whether her professional name had acquired secondary meaning. Had Appellant been 
granted her motion to amend the 4AC, Respondents would in all likelihood not have 
prevailed on their motions for summary judgment, and Appellant would have had her 
day in court on a least some of her claims as proposed in the SAC. What is also 
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apparent from Respondents' oppositions, is that the Respondents assertions of prejudice 
were based on concerns that if Appellant was permitted to amend the 4AC to clarify 
"legal theories," other than trademark violations by the Respondents, she might prevail, 
not only in opposition to any subsequent motions for summary judgment by 
Respondents, but possibly at tdal. 
Requiring Respondents to defend agaMst claims of an Appellant that were 
evident from the beginning in the alleged facts, but not clearly stated, is not prejudice: it 
is justice. Allowing the lower Court's rush to inevitable summary judgment to stand 
would be a miscarriage of justice. 
d The Proposed 5AC Was Based On The Same General Set Of Facts As The 
Prior Complaints And Related Back So As To Prevent A Bar To Any Claims 
From Statutes Of Limitations 
•In 	 lits Order denying Appellant's IVIotion for Leave, the trial couit stated that 
"there is no legally supportable basis for the new causes of action.; The statutes of 
limitation appear to have run. As Appellant's counsel acknowledged, there is no federal 
or state statute that Appellant can cite to support her new causes of action 5." (CT vo1,30, 
p. 7607, Order, lines 25-28). 
5 Appellant and her counsel deny that Appellant or her counsel made any such representation to the 
Court or otherwise, of an alleged lack of statutory authority for the claims in the 4AC or the proposed 
 
SAC. Nor is statutory authority for claims required, as common law may suppOrt claims, and was also 
alleged in the 4AC and SAC. The Court is directed to the claims in the proposed SAC which specifically 
recite statutory authority for the claims. (CT vol. 21,5208 et seq, Seventh Claim for relief 
(Cal.Civ.Code §1710); Sixth Claim (Cal.Bus.Prof.Code §17200); Fifth Claim, Cal,Civ.Code (§3344).) 
4j. 
If proposed amendments to a complaint "relate back to the ame general set• of 
facts" as in the original complaint (and previous amendments), they are not barred by 
statutes of limitation that may have run by the time of amendment. Austin v. 
Massachusetts Bonding & Insurance Co. (1961) 56•CaL2d 596, 600. This is true, even 
if the Appellant alleges a different legal theory or new cause of action. Kittredge Sports 
Co. v. Superior Court (1989) 213 Cal.App.3d at 1048. 
Not only did the trial court not support its conclusion in its denial of Appellant's 
. mo.tion.for leave, that the statutes of limitation had run (i.e. no relation back) but neither 
Defendant provided examples of proposed amendments that did not relate back to the 
general facts previously alleged by Appellant. 
Defendant Google asserted in its Opposition to the Motion for Leave that the 
amended claims raised "new. issues ' Additionally Google asserted that the 
amendments placed ''new rights" in issue, 'other than, Dr. Ison's purported trademark 
rights." (CT vol.26, p.6700, Google Opp. Mot, Leave, line 16; p.6701, lines 10-11). 
'New issues" do not constitute ''new facts," so as to prevent relation back of 
amendments. 'New rights," i,e. new claims andfor new legal theories are exactly what 
our Courts have contemplated in their decisions preserving a APpellant's rights to 
correct insufficiencies in complaints and prevent serious prejudice. Williams v. Braslow, 
(1986) 179 Cal.App.3d at 774; Sanai v. Saltz (2009) 170 Cal.App.4th at 768; Burkle v. 
Burkle (2006) 141 Cal,App.4th at 1042; Honig v. Financial Corp. of America (1992) 6 
Cal.App.4th at 965; and Blakey v. Superior Court (1984) 153 Cal.App.3d at 107. 
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Defendant Yahoo! did not directly address any alleged failtire of the proposed 
SAC to relate back, in its Opposition to Appellant's motion for leave, but asserted that 
"[AP of the new proposed claims are based on wholly different sets of alleged rights 
and obligations," and that the proposed fourth and fifth causes of action were "based on 
the alleged commerciall value of the Appellant's personal identity as an individual, 
which is wholly distinct from trademark rights..." (CT vol.26, p.6718,Yahoo! 
Opp.Mot.Leave SAC, lines 23-26). 
The trial court had before it Appellant's proposed SAC, as well as a document 
detailing the changes between the SAC and the 4AC, demonstrating that the SAC was 
based on the same general set of facts as set forth in the original compla nt through the 
4AC. (CT vol.21, 5259 et seq., Comparison of SAC with 4AC). Moreover, the lower 
Court could not have failed to observe that the proposed 5AC was not limited to alleged 
trademark rights ofAppellant, but included allegations that her buSiness name and 
identity were misused by both Respondents under California common and statutory 
laws and would therefore provide Appellant with additional defenses against the 
Respondents' motions for summary judgment. The lower Court did not support its 
denial of the Motion for Leave with any finding that Appellant's allegations in the 
proposed SAC would not create additional genuine issues of material fact that would 
render summary judgment a clear error. (CT vol.30, p,7607, Order). 
Examples of the relation back of the proposed amendments in the SAC include: 
the fourth claim for relief in the proposed SAC for commercial misappropriation under 
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California common law; corrected deficiencies in the previous sixth claim of the 4AC, 
alleging that Appellant had the "sole right to profit frora the commercial value of her 
identity and to protect the economic value of her name," and that Respondents 
appropriated her "identity and name to commercial advantage" without her consent "to 
promote third party advertising of unrelated products and services on the Internet; and 
alleged additional facts meeting elements of the claim (CT vol.2 I, p.5246, p oposed 
5AC, 71150-155). 
The proposed fifth claim for relief for statutory misappropriation relied on 
previously alleged facts of the misuse by Respondents of Appellant's identity and name 
for profit (CT vol.21, pp.5246-5247, proposed 5AC, n158-160). The sixth claim for 
relief in the proposed 5AC (previously the: venthI.c1aiin in 4AC) tbr unfair trade 
practices under Cal.Bus.Prof.Code §17200 also alleged misuse of Appellant's name 
(11168). Similarly, the seventh claim for relief in the proposed 5A'p for fraudulent and 
deceitful concealment under Cal.Civ.Code §171O alleged facts that had been previously 
alleged regarding intentional concealment by Respondents from Appellant of the risks 
of using her name in Respondents advertising and website hosting programs, as well as 
other supporting elements required under the statute. (11176, 177,182). The alleged 
facts in the new eighth and ninth claims for relief in the proposed 5AC for negligence 
or recklessness, and negligent interference with prospective economic relations, were 
facts alleged in the previous complaints, or facts obtained during discovery that arose 
out of tile same general set of facts previously alleged. 
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Dental of leave to amend by the trial Court constituted clear•abuse of discretion. 
C. THE COURT ERRED IN GRANTING RESPONDENTS MOTIONS FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Whether a descriptive term or mark has acquired a secondary meaning is a question 
of fact. Levi Strauss & Co. v. Blue Bell, Inc. (9th Cir. 1985) 778 F.2d 1352, 1355. 
Although a personal name used in commerce must acquire secondary meaning to 
receive trademark protection five years of continuous and exclusiye use in commerce 
constitutes prima facie evidence of common law secondary meaning under both 
California and Federal law. Business and Professions Code § 14205(e)(3) 'fhe 
secretary may accept as evidence that the mark has become distinctive, as used on or in 
connection with the applicant's goods or services, proof of continuous use the eof as a 
mark by the applicant in this state for the five years before the date on which the claim 
of distinctiveness is made." Although there appears to be no case law directly 
addressing this subsection, academic analysis agrees with this reading 191 Contemp. 
Legal Issues 41 Part One: The Common Law, the States, and Historical Perspective: 
Requirements for Mark Registration and Renewal under California's New Trademark 
Law, Borzcik (2008) " n13. 3 Restatement of Unfair Competition §§13-14, listing 
various types of designations that cannot function as marks unless they have acqui ed 
"secondary meaning" in the minds of prospective purchasers. See MSTL § 14205(e), 
which codifies the common-law doctrine but then allows "proof of continuous use ... as 
a mark by the applicant in this state for the five years before the date on which the claim 
of distinctiveness is made" to satisfy the "secondary meaning element for purposes of 
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registration." Registration with the state under California Business and Professions Code 
§14205(e)(3) was not necessary; registration would merely have extended her common 
law trade name rights statewide. To interpret §14205(e)(3) any other way would render 
the language of the statute superfluous verb age; after all, the secretary already has a 
right to consider evidence of various types in support of trade ark clahns. 
Federal law, which parallels California trademark law, also concurs. "Guidelines 
appearing in Patent and Trademark Office, Trademark Manual of Examining Procedure 
§ 1212.05 indicate that unde § 2(1) of the Lanham Act proof of substantially exclusive 
and continuous use for five years will generally suflke to establish secondary' meaning 
for surnames and marks that are not highly descriptive, it is not sufficient for highly 
descriptive terms, container shapes, or ornamentation." 3Restatement of Unfair 
Competition, § 13, Since admissible ev dence demonstrates that the Appellant started 
her pract ce in 2004, her personal professional name acquired secondary meanmg no 
later than 2009. (CT 4178, vol. 17, lson Decl, line 20) 
Although the "five years of continues and exclusive use" rule seems likely to 
have been a bright line to simplify the work of government bureaucrats, six years of 
continuous and exclusive use has elsewhere been treated as evidence of secondary 
meaning, which would grant the Appellant trademark rights no later than 2010. Trak 
Inc. v. Benner Ski KG, 475 F.Supp. 1076 (D.Mass.1979)). Use and seniority were 
considered the most important evidence of secondary meaning under the common law. 
Judge Learned Hand said in relation to trademarks that ". . . it is the priority of user 
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alone that controls, even though when the defendant comes into the field, it may not be 
fully established or even be enough established to become largely associated in the 
public mind with the Appellant's mark. Were it not so, it would be'of extreme difficulty 
to show at just what point in time the mark became associated with the maker in enough 
of his customer's minds to justify the inference that the defendant's use might have 
become confusing. Therefore, once his use begins, the rest of the public must avoid his 
fanciful mark." Waldes v.International Manufacturers' Agency. Inc„ 237 F. 502, 505 
(1916)) No particular level of public awareness was needed. Secondary meaning does 
not require "all the people, nor most of the people nor very many of the people of a 
place, but so many of them as contradistinguishes •them from a few.'" Mary Pickford Co. 
v. Bayly Bros., Inc., 12 Ca1.2d 501, 514 (1939) 
Other examples of names that acquired secondary meanmg without being used 
for particularly long included a play produced only in New York that acquired 
secondary meaning throughout the United States. Aronson v. Fleckenstein, 28 F. 75; 
Hemingway v. Film Alliance of United States, Inc., 174 Misc. 725 [21 N.Y.S.2d 827]; 
Frohman v. Payton, 34 Misc. 275 [68 N.Y.S. 8491, and a play that had only been 
produced for a few weeks in Paris, France Frohman v. Wifi. MorriS, 68 Misc. 461 [123 
N.Y.S. 1090]. The Restatement of the Law of Torts, 3d, (§ 716b.), puts it simply: "No 
particular period of use is required." Nor does the number of people aware determine 
secondary meaning. Jackson v. Universal international Pictures, Ina, 36 Cal. 2d 116, 
122 (The precise size of this segment of the public is important in connection with the 
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amount of damages which should be awarded, but it does not •determine whether the title 
has acquired a secondary meaning, when only about 3,750 persons attended 
performances of play.) 
Regardless of where the burden of proof belonged, the trial Court still erred in 
granting summary judgment to the Respondents by ignoring ample evidence in support 
of secondary meaning already in the record. For example, courts across the country have 
treated imitation and copying as evidence in support of secondary meaning. 1Iarlequin 
Enterprises Ltd. v. Gulf & Western Corp., 644 F.2d 946 (2d Cir.I981); RJR Foods, Inc. 
v. White Rock Corp., 603 F.2d 1058 (2d Cir.1979). Some courts have held that 
deliberate copying creates a prima facie case of secondary meaning Lvi Kramer 
Manufacturing Co. v. Andrews, 783 F.2d 421 (4th Cir.1986); Audio Fidelity, Inc. v. 
High Fidelity Recordings, Ina, 283 F.2d 551 (9th Cir.1960); Perbii Corp. v. Perini 
Construction, Inc., 915 .17 .2d 121 (4th Cir.1990); Processed PlastiC Co. v. Warner 
Communications, Inc., 675 F.2d 852, 857 (7th Cir. 1982) (intentional copying 
establishes presumption of intent "to create a confusing similarity Of appearance and to 
have succeeded at doing so.") 
Intentional attempts to take advantage of another's business goodwill have been 
treated as evidence of both secondary meaning and unfair competition. Trade dress 
should be "protected•against intentional, deliberate attempts to capitalize on a distinctive 
product" where 'secondary meaning is 'in the making' but not yet fully developed." 
Metro Kane Imports, Ltd v. Federated Dept Stores, Inc., 625 F. Supp. 313, 316 
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•(S.D.N.Y. 1985), affd, 800 F.2d 1128 (2d Cir. 1986); Laureyssens:v. Idea Group, Inc., 
964 F.2d 131 (2d Cir.1992) (intentional copying supports an inference of secondary 
• meaning if the circumstances show an intent to benefit from the prior user's good will, 
citing Restatement Third, Unfair Competition § 16, Comment b (Tent. Draft No.2 
(1990)); "The essence of the law of unfair competition is fa r play- fair play to the 
consumer and to one's competitor. Competition may be vigorous, but not deceptive. Our 
own Court of Appeals recently gave strong support to the enforcement of 'increasmgly 
higher standards of fairness of corn ercial morality in trade,' when it ruled that intent to 
trade on another's reputation and name brings its own condemnation, even  absent proof 
of secondary meaning" Atlantic Monthly Co. v. Frederick Ungar Publishing Co. 197 F. 
Supp. 524 534. Academic analysis is on board with this idea."[E]videnee that the trade 
dress or product design was intentionally cop ed by a competitor can support an 
inference of secondary meaning if the circumstances indicate an intent to benefit from 
the good will of the prior user through confusion." Restatement of the Law, 3d, Unfair 
Competition, § 16 comment b at 106, The American Law Institute (1995). 
Furthermore, secondary meaning can develop quickly to preclude knock-off 
artists from infringing Maternally Yours, Inc. v. Your Maternity Shop, Inc., 234 F.2d 
538, 541 (2d Cir. 1956) (secondary meaning acqu red in mark MA'TERNALLY 
YOURS for maternity apparel store in the 11 months preceding defendant's opening of 
store named YOUR MATERNITY SHOP.) Courts in the interest cif justice have even 
protected trade dress without secondary meaning Saratoga Vichy Spring Co. v. Lehman, 
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625•F.2d 1037, 1044 (2d Cir. 1980). These practices include palming off, actual 
deception, appropriation of another's property, Norwich Pharmacal, 271 F.2d 569, 570- 
71; Upjohn Co. v. Schwartz, 246 F.2d 254, 261-62 (2d Cir 1957), 'or deliberate copying. 
Morex S.P.A. v. Design Inst. ofAm., Inc., 779 F.2d 799, 801-02 (24 Cir. 1985); Perfect 
Fit Indus., 618 F.2d 950, 952-54; Cytanovich Reading Center v. Reading Game (1984) 
162 Cal. App. 3d 107, 113 (subsequent imitation of that name or design by another, with 
the effect of confusing or deceiving buyers as to the origin of goods or services, may be 
enjoined as unfair competition, even though the origMal name is unprotected by 
trademark, copyright, or patent, dicta). Nor is actual confusion necessary Winfield v. 
Charles, 77 Cal.App.2d 64, 70. 
This is a particular problem for professionals such as the Appe lant who often 
face ethical restrictions on the use of ‘`fancifur names and frequently rely on secondary 
meaning to protect their reputations. The Appellant must abide by her rules of 
professional responsibility. Business and Professions Code § 17500, 16 Code of 
California Regulations § 1396.2 (A psychologist shall not misrepresent nor permit the 
misrepresentation of his or her professional qualifications affiliations, or purposes, or 
those of the institutions, organizations, products and/or services with which he or she is 
associated.) The special ethical requirements of her profession impose an affirmative 
duty on the Appellant to defend her professional personal name aggressively flad the 
Appellant filed a fictitious business name she would have bad a rel?uttable presumption 
of the secondary meaning in her professional business name in her geographical area 
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("Filing a fictitious business name•statement, when required pursuant to Bus. & Prof. 
Code § 17910, creates a rebuttable presu nption that the registrant has the exclusive 
right to use as a trade name, in the county of filing, that fictitious business name and any 
other confusingly similar trade name California Business and Professions Code § 
14411.) However, individual proprietors are not required to register, for the obvious 
reason that consumer confusion is not an issue (or should not be). Kohler v. Stephenson, 
39 Cal App 374, 178 (1919). 
The Appellant has put forth other evidence in suPport of her trademark claims. 
Uniqueness, which the Appellant has also claimed and appears to be beyond 
dispute is also evidence in support. "A mark may be strengthened by extensive 
advertising, length of time in business, public recognition, and uniqueness." Century 2 1 
Real Estate Corp. v. Sandlin (9th Cir. 1988) 846 F.2d 1175, 1179. 
Exclusivity, which the Appellant has also demonstrated, alsb constitutes evidence 
in support. Ford Motor Co. v. Summit Motor Products, Inc., 930 F,2d 277 (3d Cir.) 
(1991) (extent of sales and advertising, length of use, exclusivity of use, copying by 
another , customer surveys, customer testimony, use in trade journals size of the 
company, number of sales, number of customers, and actual confusion). Both of these 
characterize the Appellant's marks. 
The judgments in favor of the Respondents should, for the reasons above, be 
reversed. 
5.1 
D. THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN DENYING THE 
APPELLANT'S RIGHTS TO BASIC DISCOVERY THROUGH 
INTERROGATORIES AND PROPER PMK DEPOSITIONS 
Parties `may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privileged, that is relevant to 
the subject matter involved in a pending action. Cal. Civ. Proc. §2017.010 The standard of 
review in regard to a• court's denial of discovery is abuse of discretion. Fisher .v.r Superior Court 
(1986) 177 Cal. App. 3d 779, 784, 
The trial Court abused its discretion  by not allowing the Appellant the chance to fully 
develop her case through intenogatories and requests for production of documents or her 
requests for "PMK" depositions with qualified deponent•, which the Respondents 
unmeritoriously objected to or refused to adequately provide. (CT vol. 14, pp. 3562-3563, 
Order Re: Mot to Compel; vol. 20, pp. 5166-5170, Order Re: Pl's Depo Mc to Yahool.; vol. 28, 
pp. 7053-7056, Order on Google PMK ). Unmeritorious objections are considered discovery 
abuse pursuant to Cal.Civ.Proc §2023 .010. Liberty Mutual Eire Ins. Co. .14 LeL Admsrs, 
(2008) 163 CalApp.4 th 
 1093, 1106. In addition, the discovery Court's denied Appellant her 
right to question Yahoo 1 in relation to the website hosting contract that she had with Yahoo! 
(CT vol. 14, pp3562-3563, Order Re: Mot to Compel.) 
Courts are allowed to lhnit the scope of discovery if they determine that the burden, 
expense or intrusiveness of it clearly outweighs the likelihood of obtaining admissible evidence. 
(Cal. Civ. Proc. §2017.020.) In this case, the problems that led to this lawsuit relate to many 
aspects of each of Respondents individual systems because each of those systems is highly 
integrated. Broad questioning of the Respondents in regard to their systems is therefore 
necessaiy. It is not Appellant's problem that Respondents created their systems in the way they 
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did, or that their actions led to an e)densive amatmt of evidence. The Respondents need to be 
held to account. 
Because of the discovery abuses by Respondents and abuse of ciscretion by the Court, 
Appellant respectfully requests reversal of all discovery rulings and a•re pening of discovery. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
It cannot be any more apparent that by denying Appellant the ability to correct 
the 4AC to state causes of action not restricted to whether she had trade ark rights in 
her name, the trial court laid the foundation for granting Respondents motions for 
sum ary judgment. This Court should soundly reject the type of games anship 
evidenced by both Respondents and implicitly endorsed by the trial Court by reversing 
both the denial of Appellant's Motion for Leave to File a Fifth Amended Complaint and 
the grant of Respondents' Motions for Summary Judgment. The Court should also 
remand with instructions to grant Appellant's Motion for Leave to file her 5AC, and to 
reopen discovery so the Appellant can fairly litigate her case. 
Dated: January 6, 2014 
  
   
Carla Ison, Ph.D. 
Propria Persona 
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